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NOTES
DRINKING AND INTOXICATION
Intoxication or drinking during the hours of employment is
a very serious offense and is often held to be a just cause for
discharge. Such conduct tends to lower the efficiency and morale
of the employee as well as to endanger the public relations of
the employer and to pose the threat of severe damage to the
lives and property of many people. That the employer has the
right to prohibit the use of intoxicating beverages during work-
ing hours and to discipline the violators of such a prohibition is
not open to question. However, the severe and extreme penalty
of discharge is questioned in some instances where it is believed
that an injustice has been done to an employee by the meting
out of such discipline.
A discharge for intoxication or drinking during working hours
is arbitrated and determined according to the terms of the col-
lective agreement or contract between the union and the em-
ployer. That agreement usually provides that an employer may
discharge an employee for "just and sufficient cause," with a
further stipulation that "if after investigation it is found that
the employee is disciplined unjustly he will be reinstated with
full rights and lost compensation." In some cases the agreement
expressly provides for summary discharge for intoxication or
drinking. A few agreements stipulate that management has a
right to discharge employees, but that the employee has a right
to show that he has been "unjustly dealt with" or that "any
difference or dispute" between the parties is to be referred to
arbitration.
The contract usually sets up an arbitration procedure for the
determination of disputes that are not otherwise settled through
the grievance machinery. When the arbitration stage is reached,
the arbitrator has to decide two basic issues: (1) Did the em-
ployee commit the offense for which he was discharged? (2)
Was the employee disciplined unjustly under the circumstances
of the particular case? (If it is conceded that the employee com-
mitted the offense, then, of course, only the second issue has to
be determined.) The burden of proving the commission of the
offense is on the company since it is attempting to establish a
fact essential to its right to discharge.,
1. See note, Evidence, Burden and Quantum of Proof, this issue.
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In the absence of a contract provision regarding the quantum
of evidence required to sustain the burden of persuasion, cases
are ample2 which require a preponderance of evidence, or the
satisfaction of the arbitrator that there was just cause. (The
latter is a subjective standard, but it is probably equal to the
objective standard of the preponderance of the evidence.)3
When it is admitted or proven, however, that the employee
has committed the offense charged, the second issue is arbi-
trated-Was the employee disciplined unjustly under the cir-
cumstances of the particular case? To determine this issue, each
case is decided on its own merits. Sometimes there are extenu-
ating circumstances or mitigating factors present which weigh
heavily in determining the justice of the penalty imposed. Such
factors include: (1) other contract provisions, (2) the employ-
er's handling of such offenses in the past, (3) discipline for
such offenses in the industry generally and in the community,
(4) the employee's equities-his past record, years of seniority
and whether it was his first offense. It was aptly said in the
case of In re Atlas Press Company:4
... it is an arbitrator's function and duty not only to decide
whether an employee is guilty of misconduct, but also to
decide, according to the habits and custom of industrial life
and the standards of justice and fair dealing prevalent in
the community, whether the penalty imposed is equitable andjust and not seriously disproportional to the offense. This
requires an arbitrator in a discharge case to frame his deci-
sion on broad moral and equitable principles and compels a
consideration on an individual basis, of the penalties im-
posed in this case.
However, the cases illustrate that there are two categories
where mitigating factors are present but are not given sub-
stantive weight by arbitrators when reviewing the justice of a
2. In re Republic Oil Refining Company and Oil Workers International
Union, Local 449 (CIO), 2 LA 305 (1946); In re Union Pacific Railroad
Company and The American Railway Supervisors' Association, Inc., 2 LA
384 (1945); In re Griggs, Cooper and Company and International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousmen and Helpers of America,
Warehouse Employees Union, Local 503 (AFL), 11 LA 194 (1948); In
re John Deere Tractor Company and United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 838 (CIO), 10 LA
318 (1948).
3. Myron Gollub, Discharge For Cause (N. Y. Dept. of Labor 1948) 16.
See note, Eidence, Burden and Quantum of Proof, this issue.
4. In re Atlas Press Company and United Steelworkers of America,
Local 2167 (CIO), 9 LA 810, 812 (1948).
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particular penalty. Where public or plant safety is involved,
the justice of the penalty is considered in the light of public
policy, safety, morals, laws and good business principles and
ethics. These two categories are:
(1) If the employee works around inflammable gases,5
power houses6 or highly dangerous machinery at the
time the offense is committed, it is held consistently
that drinking or intoxication during hours of employ-
ment is a just and sufficient cause for discharge.
(2) When the employee is a driver 7 or in personal contact
with the public at the time the offense is committed, dis-
charge for drinking or intoxication is held just, even
though other considerations and merits are present
which, except for the type of work, would cause the
arbitrator to rule the discharge unjust.
When the employee is engaged in an ultra-hazardous occu-
pation,8 the type of work is such that carelessness resulting from
drinking or intoxication will endanger the safety and lives of
others and may result in disaster. Arbitrators consistently hold
that an employer is under a duty to take prompt action in such
cases, and that the safety and protection of other employees
require an inflexible enforcement of a no-drinking rule even
though the penalty for such conduct has not been so severe
elsewhere in the plant, or the employer has condoned drinking
in the past. When the employee is driving or in direct contact
with the public at the time the offense is committed the justice
of the penalty is reviewed in the light of state laws and the
public policy-risks to life and property-which the law seeks
to protect and a discharge is held just even though the employer
has condoned such conduct in the past. It has been held that
an employee could not reasonably suppose himself free to drink
in that instance because the company had (wrongfully) toler-
ated similar conduct at an earlier time.
5. In re Hiram Walker and Sons, Inc. and Distillery, Rectifying and
Wine Workers' International Union of America, Local 55 (AFL), 3 LA
146 (1946).
6. In re American Woolen Company and Textile Workers Union of
America (CIO), 5 LA 371 (1946).
7. In re The Western Express Company and International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local
118 (AFL), 10 LA 172 (1948); In re United Parcel Service, Inc. and Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America, Local 177 (AFL), 7 LA 292 (1947).
8. In re Allied Maintenance Company and Transport Workers Union
of America (CIO), 12 LA 350 (1949).
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When the type of work is not ultra-hazardous and the em-
ployee is not a driver nor in direct contact with the public, then
the mitigating factors or merits previously enumerated are given
due weight.
Discipline awarded in the past for similar offenses in the
particular plant, and in the industry generally, and the em-
ployer's handling of such offenses in the past, are determining
factors when considering the justice of the penalty of discharge.
Employers must show that discrimination has not been followed
in the disciplining of an employee. When the discipline for such
offenses in the past or in the industry generally has not been
the extreme penalty of discharge, it is considered unjust when
rendered without due notice and warning to the employees. If
the company has condoned intoxication or drinking in the past,
it is generally held that discharge is too severe and out of pro-
portion to the offense.9 Arbitrators hold that management's
policy should be firm and consistent so the employee will not be
led into the belief he can "get away with it." It is felt that a
systematic warning system would correct an abuse found to be
generally prevalent and would have apprised employees of the
serious consequences of repeated infractions of a no-drinking
rule.
In reviewing the justice of the penalty, the penalty for such
offenses in the courts of the particular community may influence
the arbitrator to hold that the discharge was unjust. It was held
in In re Atlas Press Co: 10
With respect to M., I think that in consideration of his past
work record, his age and seniority status, the facts that the
indiscretion occurred not on a regular work day and that
it was his first offense, the penalty of discharge imposed on
him was too severe. Frankly, in a state whose courts deem
a $100.00 fine an appropriate penalty against a public judge
convicted of drunk driving, a penalty of discharge imposed
upon an elderly but satisfactory industrial worker for a
not dissimilar offense, strikes me as something less than
full justice.
The working agreement may require the employer to post its
9. In re A. I. Namms and Son and Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Employees, Department Store Employees Union, Local 1250 (CIO),
7 LA 704 (1947); In re Tubular Rivet and Stud Company and Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, Granite Lodge 1451, 8 LA 97 (1947).
10. In re Atlas Press Company and United Steelworkers of America,
Local 2167 (CIO), 9 LA 810, 812 (1948).
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shop rules. The violation of this contract provision is usually a
mitigating factor when accompanied by other factors such as
the company's condoning such conduct in the past, etc. Then
it is an additional reason for holding the penalty unjust. How-
ever, in one case the violation of this contract provision was
the only mitigating factor and in that case it was held:
Argument that the company is obligated to post shop rules
with penalties before disciplining employees has little merit
in principle, since it is contrary to every conception of the
rights as well as the obligations attached to the management
and administration of a business property. Its only merit is
that, in the absence of posted shop rules the employer is
under a somewhat greater responsibility in showing that
discrimination has not been followed in the discipline of an
employee.11
The company may or may not be obligated to give the union
notice of offenses of the employees. But, if they have in the
past, and the union has always acted and warned the employee,
and the company discharges an employee without giving the
union notice, the discharge may be held too severe a penalty
under the circumstances. Arbitrators realize that such notice
to the union is a commendable procedure in that it gives the
union a chance to assume responsibility for the conduct of its
members, and consider it unjust not to give the union a chance
to "straighten out" the member in question as they have in the
past. 2
The employee's equities--seniority, good record, whether his
first offense-are considerations that aid in determining any
case. However, it is when the offense is only drinking or having
intoxicating liquor on the premises (rather than intoxication
proper) that these "equities" have controlling weight. Such con-
duct is not considered so serious as intoxication. When the of-
fense is only drinking, and the employee has several years
seniority, a good record with no previous offenses, and is con-
sidered to be a good worker by his superiors, it is generally held
the employee deserves some discipline but that the penalty of
discharge is too severe.13 The employee can strengthen his case
11. In re Watt Car and Wheel Company and International Molders and
Foundry Workers Union, Local 143 (AFL), 4 LA 67 (1946).
12. In re A. I. Namns and Son and Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Employees, Department Store Employees Union, Local 1250 (CIO),
7 LA 704 (1947).
13. In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. and Amalgamated Asso-
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by convincing the arbitrator that the offense won't happen again.
It is not at all unusual to find, in the same proceeding, the dis-
charge of one employee for intoxication sustained and discharge
of another employee for drinking set aside because the latter
had a good record and several years' seniority and it was his
first offense, while these factors alone do not mitigate if the
employee is actually drunk.
The cases have recognized the difference in the danger of
drinking in the extra hazardous occupations and the normal
occupations, but drinking is in and of itself, such a major deter-
rent to efficiency, safety, employee morals, good working con-
ditions and public relations, that it is necessary that some dis-
cipline be imposed for the violation. Even though the arbitrator
finds it just and equitable to commute a discharge to a lesser
discipline the employee is always penalized in some manner.
The tenor of the punishment is of necessity guided by the many
and sundry extenuating corcumstances, each of which plays a
small but significant part in each case.
OTTO A. JOHNSON
GAMBLING
I. GENERAL
Gambling of some type is prevalent in most industrial estab-
lishments, but the instances are relatively few where employees
have been discovered at and disciplined for such activity. By a
review of the cases where employees have been penalized for
gambling, either on company property or on its time, a few
general principles may be observed. The severity of discipline
exacted varies with factors such as the kind of gambling in-
volved, the job status of the offender, repetition of offense and
the nature of the plant rules prohibiting gambling. The penalty
ranges from discharge, in a minority of the cases, to mere repri-
mand in others.
The present survey covers a five year period commencing in
1943. Not much is reported on the discipline meted out to gam-
blers before the rise of union and governmental controls over
ciation of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America,
Division 1210 (AFL), 3 LA 880 (1946); In re Atlas Press Company and
United Steelworkers of America, Local 2167 (CIO), 9 LA 810 (1948).
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